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I CommentsI
The Crucifix Case: Germany's Everson
v. Board of Education?
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compli-
ance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secon-
dary schools. Families entrust public schools with the education
of their children, but condition their trust on the understanding
that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance
religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the
student and his or her family. Students in such institutions are
impressionable and their attendance is involuntary.'
I. Introduction
On August 10, 1995, the German Constitutional Court struck
down a Bavarian law which mandated that all state schools hang
crucifixes in their classrooms.2 This decision is known popularly
as the Crucifix Case.' The Court found that the Bavarian law
violated the Basic Law's' provision in Article 4, which declares
1. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987).
2. Das sog. "Kruzifix-Urteil," 32 BVerfGE (1995) [hereinafter Crucifix Case].
3. Id.
4. The Basic Law is Germany's Constitution. Grundgesetz [Constitution]
[GG] (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Basic Law]. Following World War II, the Western
Allies proposed to the eleven German states comprising West Germany a
framework for establising a German federal state. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 9 (1994). One of the
three documents known as the "Frankfurt Documents" authorized the eleven
prime ministers to call a Constitutional convention. According to the document,
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that "freedom of faith and conscience as well as freedom of creed,
religious or ideological, are inviolable."5  A family of atheists
brought this constitutional complaint and the Court held that the
law violated the atheist students' guarantee of "religious free-
dom.",6 School officials were subsequently ordered to remove the
crucifixes from those classrooms occupied by the objecting
students.7 The holding of the Constitutional Court in the Crucifix
Case marked a major departure from what had been the acceptable
contact between church and state in Germany. The United
States has also reexamined the relationship between church and
state. In Everson v. Board of Education,8 the United States
Supreme Court began the process of defining the constitutionally
proper relationship between education and the Establishment
Clause.9 Since the Everson decision, the church-state relation-
ship1" in education has been uncertain and regrettable. Has
Germany started down the same path the United States did almost
fifty years ago?
The purpose of this Comment is to compare the current trends
of Germany's church-state relationship with the already developed
Establishment Clause caselaw in the United States. As a prelimi-
nary matter, Part II of this Comment will contrast the pertinent
provisions affecting the relationship between church and state in
the German and United States constitutions. Part III will explore
the differences between the development of German and United
States church-state law. This analysis will include, specifically, the
differences between church-state law as it relates to public
education in Germany and the United States. Applying the main
the proposed Constitution would receive Allied approval if it provided for three
things: "democracy, federalism, and fundamental rights." Id. The Basic Law was
drafted by a Parliamentary Council (elected by the State parliaments), ratified by
two-thirds of the Lander Parliaments, and became effective on May 23, 1949. Id.
at 10.
5. Basic Law, art. 4.
6. Uta Winkhaus, Schools Ignore Court, Keep Crucifixes, NEWS TRIB., Aug.
17, 1996, at A6.
7. Stefanie Kreiss, Bavaria Crowd Protests Ruling on Crucifixes, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Sept. 24, 1995, at A13.
8. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that a New Jersey statute permitting boards of
education to reimburse parents for transportation by bus of children attending
parochial schools was constitutional under the Establishment Clause, but, in the
process, severely restricting public aid to religion).
9. See id.
10. For purposes of this Comment, "church-state relationship" means the
relationship between religion or a religious body and any person or entity that
qualifies as a state actor.
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Establishment Clause test articulated by the United States Supreme
Court, the Lemon" test, to the specific facts involved in the
Crucifix Case, Part IV will analyze the outcome of the Crucifix
Case had it been decided by the United States Supreme Court.
The similarities between the recent decision in the Crucifix Case
and comparable cases in the United States will be explored in Part
V. As litigation under the United States' church-state law is more
developed than similar litigation in Germany, Part VI of this
Comment will draw an important parallel between the evolution of
First Amendment litigation in the United States and possible
developments in Germany's church-state law following the Crucifix
Case.
II. Overview of the Constitutional Provisions Affecting the
Relationship Between Church and State in the United states
and Germany
The U.S. Constitution has only one provision affecting the
relationship between church and state. This provision, the First
Amendment, provides that "[c]ongress shall'make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
.... ,12 This provision has traditionally been subdivided into two
clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
Claims brought under the Free Exercise Clause are usually brought
by a plaintiff who believes that a specific governmental practice or
law burdens his ability to practice his religion. On the other hand,
claims brought under the Establishment Clause are generally
brought by a plaintiff who believes that a specific governmental
practice or law either advances a certain religion over other
religions or advances religion generally over nonreligion.13
11. The Lemon test was first formulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
12. U.S. Const. amend. I. Although the First Amendment is prefaced by the
phrase, "[c]ongress shall make no law," id, the provisions in the First Amendment
were made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). This
clause provides that "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The First
Amendment was incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell,
310 U.S. 296.
13. Traditionally, the members of the Supreme Court have split on whether
the Establishment Clause was meant to prevent the advancement of religion over
nonreligion. At the time the framers of the Bill of Rights drafted the First
1997]
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Germany's Basic Law, in contrast, contains various provisions
affecting the relationship between church and state. The center-
piece of the free exercise provisions is found in Article 4, which
provides, in part, that "[f]reedom of faith and conscience as well as
freedom of creed, religious or ideological, are inviolable. ' ,14 The
counterpart to Article 4 is Article 137 of the Weimar Constitution,
which was incorporated into the Basic Law. Article 137(1) declares
that "[tjhere shall be no state church."" Although numerous
other provisions address the church-state relationship,16 these two
are the provisions relevant to the ensuing discussion.
Interesting differences emerge from a comparison of the
United States and German provisions. First, some American
constitutional scholars assert that the meaning of the Establishment
Clause embodies only the prohibition of a national church. The
Weimar Constitution's Article 137 explicitly states that prohibition.
Thus, while the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
cannot be read so narrowly as to apply only to the establishment
of a national church, Article 137 cannot be read so broadly as to
prohibit governmental support of all religions.
Second, while the First Amendment has both an affirmative
clause (the Free Exercise Clause) and a negative clause (the
Establishment Clause) for religious persons, the Basic Law has only
one clause that can be used as a double-edged sword. For
Amendment, American society, as a whole, was predominantly Protestant. It was
not until 1961 in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), that the Supreme Court
applied the protection of the Establishment Clause to atheists. Id.
In Torcaso, the Court struck down a Maryland constitutional provision
requiring appointees to public office to declare a belief in the existence of God.
Id. Justice Black wrote that neither the state nor federal government can "aid all
religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a
belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different
beliefs." Id. at 495.
14. Basic Law, art. 4(1). This was the constitutional provision under which the
complainants in the Crucifix Case sought relief.
15. Basic Law, art. 140 (Weimar 137(1)).
16. Basic Law, art. 3(3) provides that "[niobody shall be disadvantaged or
favored because of his ... faith ... or religi[on]." Id. Article 33(3) ensures that
the "[e]njoyment of civil and political rights, eligibility for public office, and rights
acquired in the public service shall be independent of a person's religious
denomination." Id. Article 56 allows for the oath of office taken by the Federal
President to be said without the "religious affirmation" of "[s]o help me God."
Id. Article 136(4)of the Weimar Constitution declares that "[n]o one may be
compelled to perform any religious act or ceremony, to participate in religious
exercises or to take a religious form of oath." Id.
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example, the complainant in the Crucifix Case, Ernst Seler, claimed
that Bavaria's law violated his children's right to free exercise of
religion under Article 4.17 If Seler had brought this claim under
the First Amendment, he would have invoked the Establishment
Clause as protection, not the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, the very
clause that gives religious persons the protection of the Basic Law
to practice their religious beliefs can also be used to curb their
practice of religion.
One United States Supreme Court opinion illustrates this
irony. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
18
students who were Jehovah's Witnesses sought to enjoin the school
board from ordering that all students recite the pledge of alle-
giance. 9 The Supreme Court held that the school board could
not compel such behavior because it infringed the students'
guarantee of free exercise of religion.2" Justice Frankfurter, in
dissent, wrote about the irony that would result if the Court
declared that Bible reading in public schools violated the Establish-
ment Clause.2" Many parents, he wrote, would have an equally
compelling complaint that prohibiting Bible reading in schools
violated the Free Exercise Clause.22
It seems that the irony about which Justice Frankfurter wrote
is illustrated in the very structure of Article 4 of the Basic Law.
While the structure of the First Amendment results in a tension
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause,
Article 4's provision results not in tension, but in irony. Just as Mr.
Seler complained that Article 4 is violated by the crucifixes hanging
on classroom walls, other parents could conceivably complain that
Article 4 is violated by the absence of crucifixes on classroom walls.
It remains to be seen how this irony will be resolved.
17. Uta Winkhaus, All Is Quiet One Year After German Crucifix Law, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Aug. 17, 1996, at A20.
18. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
19. Id. at 629.
20. Id. at 642.
21. Id. at 659 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
22. Id. Justice Frankfurter gave another example: "The religious consciences
of some parents may be offended by subjecting their children to the Biblical
account of creation, while another state may offend parents by prohibiting a,.
teaching of biology that contradicts such Biblical account." Id.
1997]
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III. Differences Between United States and German Church-
State Law
In the United States, although the state activities which
constitute an establishment of religion are still being litigated, the
boundaries are basically settled, although inconsistent. Under
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the most "aid" the government can
give a church is tax-exempt status.23 It is quite clear that a state
may neither fund a school that provides sectarian religion classes
on the school's property24 nor directly finance a parochial
school. 5
In Germany, the lines between church and state are much
"fuzzier."26 The Basic Law permits religious instruction in state-
supported schools 27 and permits churches, as "public corpora-
tions"' to tax their members.29 Apart from the authority of the
church to tax its members, the Basic Law also guarantees annual
cash grants to churches." The state is obligated to pay for the
education of those clergy on university theology faculties.31 In
addition, new university chairs in theology, social sciences, and
pedagogic studies "are appointed with the consent of the diocese
bishop.
3 2
23. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
24. School Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
25. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
26. Justin Burke, Germans Give High Court a Cross to Bear After Rulings,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 23, 1995, at 6.
27. Basic Law, art. 7(3) provides: "Religious instruction shall form part of the
curriculum in state schools except non-denominational schools. Without prejudice
to the state's right of supervision, religious instruction shall be given in accordance
with the doctrine of the religious community concerned. Teachers may not be
obliged to give religious instruction against their will." Id. But see McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). In McCollum, the Supreme Court declared
that the school board's policy of allowing religious education in public schools was
unconstitutional. Although the classes were voluntary and students were permitted
to attend only upon request of the students' parents, the Court held that the
practice was in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id.
28. Basic Law, art. 140 (Weimar 137(5)).
29. Basic Law, art. 140 (Weimar 137(6)).
30. FREDERIC SpoTrs, THE CHURCHES AND POLITICS IN GERMANY 193-94
(1973).
31. Id. at 192.
32. Ramesh Jaura, Germany: Crucifix Ban Opens Debate of German Secular
State, INT'L PRESS SERV., Aug. 14, 1995.
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Education is one of the main functions of the state in both the
United States and Germany. Thus, it is natural that much of the
litigation over church-state matters takes place in the context of
education. In the United States, the seminal First Amendment
education case was Everson v. Board of Education.33 The Everson
Court upheld a school board's policy of reimbursing parents for the
cost of busing their children to Catholic parochial schools.
However, the Everson opinion, written by Justice Black, is much
more notable for the way in which it limited state aid to parochial
schools than for its holding.
In Engel v. Vitale,34 the Court held that a compulsory state-
composed prayer to be said by students at the beginning of each
school day violated the Establishment Clause. The decision in
Engel seemed to turn on the fact that the compulsory prayer had
been composed by the state.35 However, twenty years later, in
Wallace v. Jaffree,36 the Court declared unconstitutional an
Alabama statute which permitted public school teachers to begin
their classes with a moment of silence.37 During the moment of
silence, willing students could engage in either silent meditation or
voluntary silent prayer.38 The statute violated the Establishment
Clause because the intent of the legislature was "to return prayer
to the public schools.
39
The German Constitutional Court has addressed a similar
issue. In the School Prayer Case,' the Constitutional Court was
asked to decide the constitutionality of school prayer outside of
religion class in compulsory state schools when a student's parents
object to the prayer. At stake were competing constitutional rights.
First, Article 6(2) provides that "[t]he care and upbringing of
33. Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
34. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
35. Writing for the majority, Justice Black wrote, "It is neither sacrilegious nor
antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out
of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely
religious function to the people themselves and to those the people chose to look
to for religious guidance." Id. at 435.
36. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
37. Id. at 40.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 48 n.30.
40. 52 BVerfGE 223 (1979), reprinted in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 466
(1989).
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children are a natural right of parents."41 Articles 4(1) and 4(2)
guarantee the freedom of religion and the right to the undisturbed
practice of one's religion. 42 Finally, Article 7(1) requires that the
"entire school system . . . be under the supervision of the state. 4 3
The German Constitutional Court recognized that a voluntary
prayer led by a teacher while at school may result in tension
between the principles of free exercise and those of nonestablish-
ment, but attributed this tension to the inherent nature of the terms
of the Basic Law." Although a minority of parents may not want
their children to receive religious instruction, "the incorporation of
Christian references is not absolutely forbidden when establishing
public schools . . . ." However, the school may not limit its
educational goals to affirming Christian principles except in religion
classes which one cannot be forced to attend 6
Essentially the same principles apply in the case of school
prayer in compulsory schools. As long as no parents object to their
children taking part in a compulsory prayer, then the state may
allow for prayers to become a part of the morning exercise.47
However, if any parents object to the prayer, then the prayer must
become solely a voluntary exercise.48 This principle is in contrast
to the holdings of the United States Supreme Court, which prohibit
voluntary prayer even if there are no objections.
49
The discussion of the German Constitutional Court in the
School Prayer Case is especially interesting in light of some of the
41. Basic Law, art. 6(2).
42. Basic Law, arts. 4(1) and 4(2).
43. Basic Law, art. 7(1).
44. 52 BVerfGE 223, reprinted in KOMMERS, supra note 40, at 470.
45. Id. at 468. This principle was established in the Interdenominational
School Case, 41 BVerfGE 29 (1975), reprinted in KOMMERS, supra note 40, at 477.
46. 52 BVerfGE 223, reprinted in KOMMERS, supra note 40, at 468.
47. See generally id.
48. The same approach was taken by the Constitutional Court in the Crucifix
Case. One of the members of the Court who joined the majority opinion, Johann
Friedrich Henschel, clarified the Court's decision in an interview. Cacilie
Rohwedder, German Court Concedes Error in Its Crucifix Ruling, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Aug. 22, 1995, at 4. The ruling in the case did not prohibit crucifixes in
classrooms. Id. Instead, the court declared the Bavarian law requiring crucifixes
in classrooms unconstitutional. Id. Justice Henschel said that if all parents and
students in a particular school desire that the school hang crucifixes, then the
practice is permissible. Jaura, supra note 32. The presence of crucifixes in the
classroom is only impermissible when a student, parent, or teacher objects. Id.
49. See Engel, 370 U.S. 421, and Wallace, 472 U.S. 38.
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concerns expressed by the United States Supreme Court in the case
of religion in education. One of the main reasons given by the
Supreme Court for opposing religious expression in public schools
is the effect coercion may have on the children.5" If a child does
not wish to engage in a teacher-led prayer, the child may be
ostracized by his classmates for refusing to participate in the prayer
or may be forced to participate because of his own fear of
embarrassment. The German Constitutional Court expressed this
same concern, however it said that:
An assessment of the conditions under which the prayer is to
occur, the function that the teacher has in connection with this
exercise, and the actual conditions in the school leads us to
conclude that we need not fear discrimination against a pupil
51who does not participate in the prayer ....
It seems that the Constitutional Court has more faith in a teacher's
control over the classroom than does the Supreme Court.
IV. The Crucifix Case Analyzed Under Supreme Court
Doctrines
Over the years, the Supreme Court has articulated various tests
to help determine whether a particular state action violates the
Establishment Clause. First, in Abington School District v.
Schempp,52 the Court enunciated the first two prongs of what
would eventually become known as the Lemon test.53 The third
prong was formed in Lemon v. Kurtzman.54
In recent years, the future of the Lemon test has been put in
jeopardy. Justice O'Connor has proposed an alternative: the
"endorsement test."55 Four other Justices have offered another
alternative: the "coercion test."56 This section will examine the
fate of the Crucifix Case if it were to be analyzed under any of
these three tests.
50. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
51. 52 BVerfGE 223, reprinted in KOMMERS, supra note 40, at 472.
52. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
53. Id. at 222.
54. 403 U.S. 602.
55. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
56. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU 492 U.S. 573, 655 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
1997]
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A. The Lemon Test
Under the Lemon test, a state law must meet three require-
ments in order to be permissible under the Establishment Clause.
First, the law must have a secular legislative purpose.57 Second,
the law's primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit reli-
gion." Finally, the law must not result in an excessive entangle-
ment with religion. 9
Applying the Lemon test to the Bavarian law at issue in the
Crucifix Case, it is obvious that the law would not survive the
inquiry. Even assuming that the Bavarian law had a secular
legislative purpose, the law would fail the remaining two prongs of
the test. The primary effect of the law advances religion and the
law involves excessive entanglement of religion with government.
The law's primary effect advances Christianity at the expense
of all other religions. The crux of the Selers' complaint was that
parents should have control over the religious instruction of their
children.' According to the Court, the Bavarian law forced
children in public schools to learn "under the cross,"'" and
stripped from parents the control of their children's religious
education. If one accepts the contention of the majority of the
German Constitutional Court that the crucifix is a religious symbol,
then the presence of the crucifix connotes government support of
Catholicism over all other religions and over nonreligion.
The United States Supreme Court is sensitive to the presence
of religious symbols in the classroom.62 Since children are young
and impressionable, the presence of a religious symbol is especially
threatening. According to the Court, children, unlike adults, are
more apt to assume that any presence of religion in the classroom
57. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 613. Although Lemon v. Kurtzman was a case involving state aid
to parochial schools, the Court has since extended the entanglement prong of the
test to the presence of religion in public schools. Lee, 505 U.S. 577.
60. .Dan Fesperman, Religion Overtakes Oktoberfest, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct.
3, 1995, at 9A.
61. Stephen Kinzer, Crucifix Ruling Angers Bavarians, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 23,
1995.
62. See Edwards, 482 U.S. 578.
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means that the government supports a particular religion or religion
in general to the detriment of nonreligion.63
The problem with the Supreme Court's analysis is that it would
tend to insulate children from any reference to religion in the
classroom, whether the reference is integrated into the curriculum
or is student-initiated. Historically, the United States has treated
the classroom as a marketplace of ideas.64  Yet the Court's
assertion that children will be unable to interpret references to
religion as anything other than government support of religion
undermines the concept of the classroom as a marketplace of ideas.
Instead, the .classroom becomes a place that is devoid of all
traditional concepts of religion and, in its place, the school's
curriculum advances secular humanism, which the Court has
indicated is itself a form of religion.65
In analyzing the third prong of the Lemon test, the Court has
recognized two kinds of entanglement. First, administrative
entanglement is the result of a law that involves government
control over religious activities or control over government
functions.' Second, political entanglement is the result of the law
if the church-state relationship engenders divisiveness between
religions.67 The Bavarian law falls prey to political entanglement.
Compliance with the law by schools has created animosity between
religion and nonreligion, as evidenced by the suit brought by Mr.
Seler.6 s
63. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
64. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603. The Court stated: "The
classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection."' Id. (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.
Supp. 362, 372).
65. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.11.
66. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975). See also Lemon, 403 U.S.
602.
67. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982). See also Meek,
421 U.S. at 372.
68. Mr. Seler, a disciple of Rudolf Steiner's school of anthroposophy, has
received numerous death threats since the Constitutional Court's ruling. Fiona
Fleck, Bavarians at School Amid German Crucifix Uproar, REUTERS NORTH
AMERICAN WIRE, Sept. 12, 1995.
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B. The "Endorsement Test"
In Lynch v. Donnelly,69 Justice O'Connor first articulated her
alternative to the outdated Lemon test in a concurring opinion.
She suggested that the "purpose" and "effect" prongs of the Lemon
test ought to be revised. Under the "purpose" prong, the Court
should ask "whether government intends to convey a message of
endorsement or disapproval of religion."7 Likewise, under the
"effect" prong, the Court should ask whether a government
practice has the "effect of communicating a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion."'" Justice O'Connor
noted that "[t]he meaning of a statement to its audience depends
both on the intention of the speaker and on the objective meaning
of the statement in the community."72 Assuming arguendo that
the intention of the Bavarian lawmakers who authored this law was
entirely valid, the objective meaning must still be examined.
The objective meaning of the crucifix in Bavaria is disputed.
Since Bavaria is a highly Catholic state, it is possible that the
meaning the crucifix conveys to the reasonable person is religious
in nature. However, the majority in the Crucifix Case conceded
that the presence of a crucifix in the classroom does not exert a
"compulsion to identification with Roman Catholicism."73
Nonetheless, according to the majority, the sheer presence of the
crucifix in the classroom communicates to the viewer that the
"contents of the faith symbolized in [the crucifix] are exemplary
and worthy of adherence."74
Given the United States Supreme Court's paternalistic attitude
toward children in cases involving symbols in schools, the reason-
able person standard that the Court usually applies under this
analysis would differ in the education context. That is, the
69. 465 U.S. 668.
70. Id. at 691.
71. Id. at 692.
72. Id. at 690. According to O'Connor, "Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message."
Id. at 688.
73. Federal Constitutional Court Banishes Crosses From Bavarian Schoolrooms,
THE WEEK IN GERMANY, Sept. 8, 1995, at 6.
74. Id.
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reasonable person to which the Court will look in the context of
education is a reasonable child with the naive mentality that the
Court assigns to children in cases involving religious symbols.
Thus, the analysis will hardly differ at all from the analysis used in
the Lemon test and, under O'Connor's test, the law would not pass
constitutional muster under the First Amendment.
C The "Coercion Test"
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU,75 Justices Kennedy, White,
Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in a dissenting opinion
which articulated a competing alternative to the Lemon test.
According to these four Justices, the Establishment Clause contains
two limiting principles. First, government may not coerce anyone
to support or participate in the exercise of any religion.76 Second,
government may not "give direct benefits to religion in such a
degree that it in fact 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith,
or tends to do So.,'
' 7 7
The Bavarian law receives a much more favorable analysis
under the coercion test. First, as even the majority in the Crucifix
Case conceded, the presence of a crucifix in a classroom does not
coerce anyone to support or participate in the exercise of Roman
Catholicism.78 This argument is especially persuasive if one
accepts the assertion that the crucifix is simply a symbol of
Bavarian culture.79
-Second, the presence of a crucifix in a classroom does not
promote religion to the extent that it establishes a state religion.
According to Justice Kennedy, "[a]bsent coercion, the risk of
infringement of religious liberty by passive or symbolic accommo-
dation is minimal."" Thus, the coercion test requires a showing
that the symbolic accommodation actually establishes a religion or
tends to do so.
75. 492 U.S. 573.
76. Id. at 659.
77. Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).
78. See Federal Constitutional Court Banishes Crosses From Bavarian
Schoolrooms, supra note 73.
79. The three dissenting judges in the Crucifix Case argued that "crosses are
not so much symbolic of Christianity as of a culture shaped by Christianity."
Crossed Lines and Crucifixes, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 19, 1995, at 42.
80. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662.
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In determining whether a governmental action constitutes the
establishment of a state religion, the test looks to other types of
church-state contacts that have existed throughout the country's
history or have been found permissible in caselaw.81 Adhering to
this principle in Allegheny, Justice Kennedy found that the city's
display of a creche presented no more potential for establishment
than did the employment of a chaplain by a state legislature. .
Applying these principles to the Bavarian law, it is evident that
Bavaria's law would be permissible under the United States
Constitution. Germany's church-state relationship does not justify
labeling the presence of a crucifix in a classroom an establishment
of religion. Germany's subsidy given to churches 3 and its consti-
tutional provision permitting religious instruction in public schools
according to the state's predominant religion' present no more
potential for establishment than does the presence of a crucifix in
a classroom.
V. United States Caselaw Similar to the Crucifix Case
The Supreme Court and two other federal courts have decided
cases remarkably similar to the Crucifix Case. In two of the three
cases, the courts have declared the state action unconstitutional
under Lemon."5 These cases raise a single question: When does
a symbol, such as the crucifix, have enough tradition behind its
meaning so as to rid the symbol of its religious nature?
A. Stone v. Graham
Stone v. Graham86 is the United States' equivalent to the
Crucifix Case.87  The Kentucky legislature passed a statute
81. Id.
82. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
83. See Spotts, supra note 30.
84. Basic Law, art. 7(1).
85. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub.
Sch., 33 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 1994).
86. 449 U.S. 39.
87. One interesting difference between the United States' system and
Germany's is illustrated by the Stone case. Among the plaintiffs in Stone were
taxpayers. Stone, 599 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Ky. 1980). Because the First Amendment
prohibits a law "respecting an establishment of religion," the taxpayers had
standing to ask the Court to enjoin the school from posting the Ten Command-
ments. In the Crucifix Case, on the other hand, only a student, or parent of a
student, has standing to seek relief from the Court. This is due to the structure
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requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments on the wall of
each public school classroom in the state."8 Evaluating the statute
under the Lemon test, the Supreme Court did not proceed past the
first prong. The Court's opinion stated that the main purpose of
Kentucky's statute was "plainly religious in nature" and had no
secular legislative purpose, even though the legislation included a
statement of avowed secular purpose.89
Irrelevant to the Court's reasoning was the fact that the Bible
verses were to be posted rather than read aloud. Nor was the
Court persuaded that there was no governmental action because
the copies of the Ten Commandments were to be financed by
voluntary private contribution. 9° Instead, the Court insisted on
disbelieving the avowed secular purpose of the Kentucky legislature
and, without independently inquiring into the "actual" purpose,
declared the statute void.9'
Although the Ten Commandments was said by the Kentucky
statute to have been adopted "as the fundamental legal code of
Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United
States,"92 the Court ignored the tradition behind the Command-
ments. However, in Marsh v. Chambers,93 the Court held that the
practice of opening sessions of the Nebraska Legislature with a
prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause. Central to the
Court's decision was the fact that "[t]he opening of sessions of
of the Basic Law. Because the only provision that can be invoked under the Basic
Law is freedom of religion, only students can claim that their guarantee to
freedom of religion was infringed by the presence of a crucifix on the classroom
wall. A taxpayer would not have standing to claim that his guarantee of freedom
of religion had been infringed because his religious beliefs would not be curbed
merely by requiring that he pay taxes to the school.
See generally KOMMERS, THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 13 (1994).
Thus, in the United States, because of the Establishment Clause, the pool of
possible plaintiffs is much larger than in Germany.
88. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.178 (Baldwin 1978).
89. The Kentucky statute required that each posted copy contain the following
notation at the bottom of the copy: "The secular application of the Ten
Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of
Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States." KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 158.178(2).
90. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.178(3).
91. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41.
92. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.178(2).
93. Marsh, 463 U.S. 783.
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legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is
deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country."94
The Marsh Court traced the history of legislative prayer and
found that, because the framers of the Constitution continued to
open each legislative session with prayer, such a practice clearly
was not constitutionally invalid.95 If this same standard were
applied to Stone, the Court. would have had no choice but to
validate the statute. The Ten Commandments is a document that
has been accepted as the fundamental legal code of both the
secular and religious world." Much of Western Civilization has
recognized the Ten Commandments in a secular context; however,
apparently such recognition is not sufficient to establish the
Commandments as part of tradition.
One may wonder why it is necessary to strip a symbol of all its
religious meaning before it can survive Establishment Clause
scrutiny. After all, the framers of the Constitution condoned and
participated in various religious activities that were state-supported.
For example, the legislative prayer in Marsh was permitted because
history shows that the first Congress opened each session of the
legislature with prayer.97 Absent such a showing, however, the
prayer by the Nebraska legislature would not have been permitted.
The practice would not have been upheld if, for example, the
reason for the prayer was because the legislators wanted to invoke
the protection and blessing of God before the start of each day.
Yet, the first Congress most certainly engaged in prayer for that
very reason - not for the traditional and wholly secular reason that
today's Court insists upon finding before validating a religious
practice.
B. Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Public Schools
In Washegesic,98 the district court held that the display of a
two-foot by three-foot portrait of Jesus outside the principal's office
violated the Establishment Clause.99 Applying Lemon to the state
action, the court found that all three prongs were violated. First,
94. Id. at 786.
95. Id. at 786-91.
96. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.178(2).
97. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787-88.
98. 813 F. Supp. 559 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
99. Id. at 562.
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the school had no secular purpose.1 ° Second, the court deter-
mined that the primary effect of the picture was to "advance
religion in general and Christianity in particular."' '°1 Third, the
display of the picture by the school excessively entangled govern-
ment in religion.1
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the holding of the district
court.10 3 Judge Guy, in a concurring opinion, protested the
reasoning of the majority opinion on the ground that the picture of
Jesus was simply a reproduction of a famous portrait." The
portrait, "Head of Christ" by Warner Sallman, had been reprinted
500 million times.0" According to Judge Guy, the portrait "no
more conveys the notion of the establishment of a religion than a
statue of Robert E. Lee in a park suggests we should dissolve the
Union. '"" Dismissing the idea that the portrait constituted an
establishment of religion, Judge Guy wrote:
For me, at least, a discussion of "psychological damage"
resulting from viewing this picture does implicate an establish-
ment - but not one of religion. What is established is a case of
"eggshell" plaintiffs of a delicacy never before known to the
law. I can well understand that someone (perhaps this plaintiff)
in some sense could be offended by this portrait, but "injured"
is another matter. In this multicultural world that young
persons are entering today, I would hope our schools are
turning out people with a little more resiliency than is evi-
denced here .... I do not mean to suggest that the "appropri-
100. The school claimed to have a secular purpose, but the school officials
could not assert any purpose behind the original decision to display the picture.
During their deposition, the officials stated that the only reason they would not
take the picture down was to avoid censorship. Id. at 562 n.7.
101. Id. at 562. The court stated, "If in no other way, the display of the portrait
advances Christianity because it exposes students to the fundamental figure of the
Christian religion without providing them access to portrayals of leaders, prophets,
or divinities of other religions or to depictions of advocates of nonreligion." Id.
at 562 n.8.
102. According to the court, the fact that the picture hung in the hallway
implied endorsement of the picture by the school. The court expressed its
"concern" that students may feel pressure to, if not believe in the teachings of
Jesus, at least suppress any disagreement they might have with the Christian
religion. Id. at 563.
103. Washegesic, 33 F.3d 679.
104. Id. at 684.
105. Id. at 684 n.2.
106. Id. at 684.
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ateness" of this picture in the school is not a legitimate issue for
discussion, but it ought to be resolved within the school con-
text.07
Judge Guy suggested that students offended by the picture
could take various forms of action. First, they could form clubs
promoting other religious groups or philosophies. 8 Second, the
students could lobby for courses in comparative religions.'0 9
Third, students could wear tee-shirts "proclaiming the virtues of
agnosticism."'' m Although these statements may be dismissed as
sarcasm, Judge Guy makes an important point. In our society we
have become all too willing to resort to the courts for a judicial
remedy and, in the process, have become all too reluctant to
combat problems with our own unique solutions.
C. Clever v. Cherry Hill Township Board of Education
In Clever,"' a district court declared that a school district
policy which required classrooms to maintain calendars depicting
various national, ethnic, and religious holidays and which permitted
seasonal displays containing religious symbols"2 did not violate
the Establishment Clause. Applying the Lemon test, the court
determined that the school policy did not offend the First Amend-
ment.
First, the court found that the school board had a secular
purpose of promoting religious diversity.1' 3 Second, the primary
effect of the school policy was to show "benevolent neutrality"
toward religion."4 The opinion noted that the absence of reli-
gious displays in school may appear to the young viewer to be
107. Id. at 684-85.
108. Washegesic, 33 F.3d at 685.
109. Id.
110. Id. Judge Guy concluded his concurrence by issuing a plea to students:
"[I]f I am permitted to use the expression, for heaven's sake, stay out of the
courthouse and quit trivializing the Constitution!" Id.
111. 838 F. Supp. 929 (D.N.J. 1993).
112. The policy provided that displays should be centrally located in the school
building. Displays would consist of religious symbols indicating the specific
holiday which was to be celebrated. The policy mandated that any religious
symbol displayed must appear with at least one other religious symbol and one
cultural or ethnic symbol. School officials were to remove religious displays after
ten days. Id. at 934.
113. Id. at 939.
114. Id. at 940.
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government hostility towards religion, which would also violate the
effects prong of the Lemon test."' Finally, the court determined
that allowing such a policy would not result in excessive entangle-
ment between government and religion." 6
The decision in Clever was clearly in line with Supreme Court
precedent. In Allegheny,"7 the Court invalidated a city's practice
of displaying a creche during the Christmas season. Because the
creche stood alone without any secular symbol detracting from the
display, the Court found that "nothing in the context of the display
detract[ed] from the creche's religious message. '" 8 The Court
distinguished its holding in Lynch v. Donnelly"9 on the ground
that, in Lynch, the city's display of the creche was permissible
because various religions were represented in the display, and
nonreligious objects were displayed."2°
Many cities planning holiday displays label the rule that comes
out of Allegheny the "reindeer rule."'' This rule exhibits the
absurdity of the majority's ruling. In order for a state-sponsored
display to pass constitutional muster, the state actor must ensure
that a plethora of religions and nonreligions are represented in the
display. Essentially, the state actor has to put a few plastic
reindeer next to the creche or menorah in order to be able to
display the religious symbol.
Thus, the rule emerging from Allegheny was that if a state
actor wished to commemorate a specific religious holiday, the state
must ensure that it gives each religion equal treatment. Presum-
ably, this is because the religious message is sufficiently diluted so
as to disclaim governmental support of any particular religion.
115. Id. at 940-41. See also Lee, 505 U.S. 577, and Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 112 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
116. Clever, 838 F. Supp. at 941.
117. Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573.
118. Id. at 598.
119. Lynch, 465 U.S. 668. The display at issue in Lynch included a Santa Claus
house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, carolers, colored lights, a Christmas tree, a
banner that read "Seasons Greetings," and a creche. Id. at 671.
120. Id. at 679-80.
121. Michael McGough, Menorah Wars: What the Reindeer Rule Hath Wrought;
Religious Displays on Public Grounds, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 5, 1990, at 12.
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VI. The Evolution of Church-State Litigation in Germany and
the United States-The Transformation of Education as a
Church Function to Education as a State Function
Until Everson,'22 litigation under the Establishment Clause
was quite rare."z  Once Everson was decided however, the
Court's opinion left many questions open under the Establishment
Clause. Thus, from 1946 until the present, the Establishment
Clause has become a source of great controversy, especially in the
realm of education.
On the other hand, litigation under the Basic Law's Article 4
is relatively rare. Prior to the Crucifix Case, very few Article 4
disputes took place in the context of education. 24 The Constitu-
tional Court's decision in the Crucifix Case has made many
Germans aware of the controversy over religion and education.
Since the dispute in the Crucifix Case took place in Bavaria, a
highly Catholic state, the likelihood of complaints in less religious
states is great, as there will be greater religious diversity among
citizens.
After so many quiet years in the area of church-state litigation,
why has this controversy erupted? Commentators have given
various reasons for the phenomenon in the United States. This
section will analyze whether a particular reason for the change is
present in Germany and whether future litigation over the
relationship between church and state can be expected to become
commonplace in the aftermath of the Crucifix Case.
The education systems of both Germany and the United States
originated as functions of the church. In the United States,
education became the duty of the states beginning in the 1830s and
1840s.'.' Early public schools, the "common schools," were quite
different from their non-public predecessors due to efforts to
promote national unity.26
122. Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
123. See generally J.M. O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION (1949).
124. See School Prayer Case, 52 BVerfGE 223; Interdenominational School
Case, 41 BVerfGE 29.
125. JOEL SPRING, THE AMERICAN SCHOOL: 1642-1985 70 (1986).
126. Id. at 71.
THE CRUCIFIX CASE
Beginning in the twentieth century, the federal government
became significantly involved in public education. For example, the
federal government has assumed responsibility for ensuring that
students receive equal educational opportunities.127 As the Court
said in Brown v. Board of Education:" "Today education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expendi-
tures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society .... It is the
very foundation of good citizenship.'
1 29
It was not until the establishment of public schools that
conflicts occurred between church and state in education. As the
idea of religious education was still relatively fresh in the citizenry's
mind, conflicts between religion and education did not begin
immediately after the formation of public schools.13 Initially,
suits were brought by parents who objected to sectarian instruction
in the schools.131 However, these suits were all brought under
state constitutions132 as the First Amendment was not incorpora-
ted through the Fourteenth Amendment until Cantwell v.
Connecticut.
1 33
While controversy concerning the proper place of religion in
public education was brewing much earlier than the seminal
education case, litigation was taking place in the state courts under
state constitutional provisions.34 Thus, Establishment Clause
litigation in the educational arena began in 1947 with the
Everson135 decision.
Germany's education system also has undergone a similar
transformation. Virtually from the time of the Reformation until
127. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 493.
130. See generally O'NEILL, supra note 123, at 141.
131. Id. at 141.
132. Id.
133. Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296. Some commentators attribute the confusion
existing in church-state relations to the separate incorporation of the Establish-
ment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. It is said that the Establishment
Clause was meant to complement the Free Exercise Clause not create a separate
cause of action.
134. O'NEILL, supra note 123, at 141.
135. Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
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1918, German schools were run by the church.136 Disagreements
between the church and government arose in the early nineteenth
century and escalated until 1968. The controversy centered on
whether the church or the state should control elementary
education. In addition, disputes arose over whether schools should
be confessional'37 or denominational138 and, after national unifi-
cation, whether such decisions should be left to the Reich or
Land 139 government to decide such matters."4
The first serious effort to break the church's monopoly on
elementary education came in 1918, after Germany's collapse.
141
In drafting the Weimar constitution, the national assembly
formulated the Weimar school compromise. Although this
recognized "parents" rights, 42  it prohibited turning
interconfessional schools into confessional schools.143 Neverthe-
less, in 1933, eighty-three percent of the elementary schools in
Germany were confessional.'"
After World War II and during the Allied occupation of West
Germany, the current version of the Basic Law was adopted. 45
The Basic Law now contains an entire article on school educa-
tion."4 This section specifically provides that it is the responsibili-
ty of the Lander to establish schools. 47
136. Spotts, supra note 30, at 208.
137. A confessional school is usually Catholic or Protestant. KOMMERS, supra
note 40, at 477.
138. An interdenominational school is "a Christian-oriented school designed to
serve students of all denominations." Id. at 478.
139. The Lander governments are those of the individual federal states. Uwe
Thaysen, THE BUNDESRAT, THE LANDER & GERMAN FEDERALISM 9 (1994).
140. Spotts, supra note 30, at 208. The school system varied from area to area.
For example, in Prussia, during the early nineteenth century, the state took formal
responsibility for education but gave the clergy responsibility over school supervi-
sion. On the other hand, Baden established interdenominational schools in 1876.
Nevertheless, it still gave the church a controlling influence over them. Matters
involving church and school were handled by the same agency, the Kultus ministry.
Id.
141. Id.
142. Weimar Constitution, Article 146.
143. Weimar Constitution, Article 174.
144. Currie, supra note 4, at 10.
145. R.H. SAMUEL & R. HINTON THOMAS, EDUCATION AND SOCIETY IN
MODERN GERMANY 103 (1949).
146. Basic Law, art. 7.
147. Id. Article 7(1) provides that "[t]he entire school system shall be under
the supervision of the state." Id.
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Apart from the School Prayer Case,"4 the Crucifix Case is
the Constitutional Court's only pronouncement on the meaning of
the freedom of religion clause in the context of education.
Essentially, the Crucifix Case is Germany's equivalent to Everson.
While this observation may be premature, the controversy in the
American church-state relationship in education started much the
same way.
VII. Conclusion
Germany's church-state relationship in the context of educa-
tion is in a period of transition. Much can be learned from the
more developed church-state controversy in the United States.
Litigation under the Establishment Clause began in an innocent
manner with the Court declaring constitutional the reimbursement
to parents of the cost of busing children to parochial schools. Even
though the decision held such practice constitutional, the Supreme
Court severely restricted the future relationship between church
and state. Very few people could have predicted the absurd
extreme to which the Court would take the Establishment Clause.
Much the same is true in Germany. The Crucifix Case may
appear on its surface to be a rather innocuous decision since the
German Constitutional Court declared that a crucifix must be
removed only if there is an objection to its presence in the
classroom. Some Bavarians may blindly accept the Court's
interpretation of Article 4's freedom of religion provision.
However, if the evolution of the church-state relationship in the
United States is any indication, it will not be long before Article 4
is used to curb the rights of religious persons entirely.
Lark E. Alloway
148. 52 BVerfGE 223.
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